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Stranded in Mauritania:  
Sub-Saharan MigrantS in a PoSt-tranSit Context
armelle Choplin and Jérôme Lombard
introduction
“Here, it is “Nouadhibou-du-monde”, le bout du monde, the end of the world,” 
said idrissa looking at the ocean.1 Stranded in nouadhibou, the second 
Mauritanian town. Stranded like all these ships in nouadhibou bay. Left 
stranded in Mauritania. this is how one could sum up the situation of 
idrissa, a young Senegalese man we met in november 2008. he arrived 
here in 2007, hoping to cross the atlantic ocean and reach the Canary 
islands by canoe. Yet, arriving in nouadhibou, he discovered ‘it was too 
late’. the european union had imposed restrictions on migration and 
its borders had been “externalized” into “transit countries” like Morocco, 
tunisia, Libya, niger or Mauritania (bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Collyer 2007; 
brachet 2009). thus, since 2006, the european union has been supervising 
the Mauritanian coast with Spanish guardia Civil agents, a helicopter and 
two motor launches. now, the international migratory route that crossed 
Mauritania seems to be well and truly closed. 
based on several field studies since 2004, our research outlines the 
reversibility of the migratory phenomenon. a study of recent migration in 
Mauritania should take into account the different phases and its transfor-
mations over time. three entangled temporalities can be underlined: long 
standing immigration in Mauritania, the transit period (2004–2008) and 
the present-day post-transit situation. historically, in this area, migratory 
flows are tied to job offers. Since its independence in 1960, Mauritania 
has offered interesting opportunities in the fishing, trading and mining 
sectors for the West african workforce. Mauritanian people admit read-
ily “foreigners have built the country.” in 2001, the discovery of oil rein-
forced this historical pull effect. Yet, in 2005 and 2006, the media focused 
overwhelmingly on the transit phenomenon and emphasized the “ille-
gal flows” towards europe (haas 2007). they presented all sub-Saharan 
1 We are grateful to Judith Scheele, post-doctoral research fellow at all Souls College 
(oxford), and Mary Pinet for their helpful comments on drafts and the translation.
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people in nouadhibou as “potential illegal migrants,” even before they 
tried to cross or thought of doing so. Moreover, they ignored the fact that 
regional migrations played a central role in the national economy and 
that most of the sub-Saharan people had been living and working there 
for a long time. thirdly, as the european union’s policies are tougher than 
ever, migrants are getting stuck in nouadhibou and nouakchott (the capi-
tal city). in these cities, they live with working immigrants who arrived a 
long time ago. 
obviously, the “transit phenomenon,” that has drawn media attention, 
is the shortest of the three migratory temporalities (before, during and 
after the transit). as migrants get stuck in Mauritanian cities, it is cur-
rently interesting to pay attention to the spatial and social changes engen-
dered by the arrival of migrants and their long-term settlement, especially 
in urban contexts. thus, our chapter also sheds light on the social impacts 
of this “post-transit situation.” 
We will first recall the transit and post-transit phases. Secondly, we will 
describe and analyse migrants’ everyday life in nouadhibou and nouak-
chott and their interactions with local society, highlighting how spaces 
and social relations are divided. thirdly, we will stress the fact that Mau-
ritanian migratory policies lead to the criminalisation of migrants and 
compound their difficulties. this “post-transit” stage gives rise to a new 
geopolitical order characterized by a spatial reversal (with the definition of 
bad places where are living migrants), increasing controls and fuels xeno-
phobic comments from those who define themselves as “autochthons” 
towards the others who they consider as “foreigners”. therefore, migra-
tion is an important issue for a country characterized by identity conflicts 
between arab africans (the Moors) and black africans  (halpulaar, Wolof, 
Soninke). 
becoming a transit Country
the recent focus of european media on illegal migrants in small fishing 
boats has led to an over-emphasis on illegal migration, neglecting the fact 
that foreigners have always constituted an important part of the Maurita-
nian population since independence was declared in 1960. talking about 
transit only makes sense if we take into account the role played by Mauri-
tania in West african migration more generally. at independence, 70% of 
Mauritanians were nomads, and the country cruelly lacked skilled labour 
and clerks. administrative posts were filled by workers from Western 
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africa (Senegal, Mali, guinea or benin) who were also employed in the 
building trade, or in electricity, plumbing and laundry services. From 
1957 onwards, the creation from scratch of the new capital, nouakchott, 
offered much employment. in the north of the country, the mining of iron 
ore begun in 1952 with the establishment of the Mines de fer de Mauritanie 
(Miferma),2 and a renewed interest in fishing turned nouadhibou into a 
centre of attraction: the newly declared ‘economic capital’ of the country, 
where fortunes could be made quickly.3 at this time, few Moors showed 
any interest in the sea and its resources, which were mainly exploited 
by Senegalese fishermen who settled in the area (diop and thiam 1990; 
 Marfaing 2005). rather than a mere point of transit, nouadhibou is first 
and foremost a city of migrants, both national and international, inas-
much as its history and its layout are directly linked to successive waves 
of migration (table 1). Pablo, a Canarian born in nouadhibou recalls:
My grandfather left the Canaries in 1938 and arrived here by canoe. he 
was fleeing from the Spanish civil war. he was poor, poorer than Moorish 
people. i am not surprised at all to see african people trying to come to the 
Canaries by dinghy. My grandfather did the same thing but the other way 
round! (interview, nouadhibou, november 2007).4
2 Miferma (Mauritanian iron Mining company) was nationalised in 1974 and renamed 
SniM (Société nationale industrielle et minière). 
3 as early as 1970, the population of nouadhibou, estimated at 18,000 inhabitants, com-
prised 11,500 Mauritanians, 3,000 sub-Saharan africans, 1,800 French and 1,000 Spanish, 
mainly from the Canary islands (bonte 2001). 
4 Since 1965 it has been difficult to distinguish exactly different groups of population in 
Mauritania. that type of criteria has not been registered anymore in successive national 
census whose results have not been published. this ethnic criteria and the ethnic propor-
tion are very sensitive.







Canarians French Moroccans total 
inhabitants
1958 1 200 250 315 230 1995
1963 2500 2000 2000 600 2000 9100




2007 79–99 000 15–20 000 150 20 5–600 100–120 000
Source: bonte 2001; Choplin and Lombard 2008.
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the Western Sahara has long been marked by regional and trans-regional 
exchange (bonte 2001). Labour migration has a long history in the area. 
among the african migrants, Senegalese and Malians were most strongly 
represented. the number of Senegalese resident in Mauritania has 
greatly fluctuated since national independence; they numbered in the 
tens of thousands until they were expelled or fled during the ‘events of 
1989’,5 since when many have returned to Mauritania. their number has 
increased over recent years, as, alongside many other sub-Saharans, they 
hope to benefit from the economic upturn following the recent discovery 
of oil. Furthermore, the democratic transition that started in 2005—inter-
rupted in august 2008 by a military putsch led by general ‘abd al-‘aziz—
led people to expect a political opening, especially with the return of 
refugees from Senegal and Mali.6 in 2006, a report from the Mauritanian 
Ministry of employment numbered about 100,000 Senegalese (nearly half 
of the present foreigners in Mauritania). this figure does not take into 
account the persons who cross the border daily or the fishermen who 
come from Senegal by sea. in 2009, the Middas survey7 that we carried out 
on 325 Senegalese settled in the three major cities of Mauritania (nouak-
chott, nouadhibou and rosso), confirmed the regularity of the arrivals 
from Senegal over more than ten years, whatever the period (before 2000, 
2000–2004, 2005–2008, after 2008). thus, Senegalese and more broadly 
West african migrants have long been essential to Mauritania’s economic 
dynamism.
5 ‘the events of 1989’ is the term used by Senegalese and Mauritanians to refer to the 
struggles that took place along the Senegal river in april 1989 (Fresia 2009; Ciavolella 
2010). Fuelled by the Mauritanian government, and initially opposing Moors to black afri-
can populations, the situation degenerated into open conflict between the two countries. 
Senegalese residents were driven out of Mauritania, and, in retaliation, Mauritanians were 
evicted from Senegal. 
6 during the events of 1989, ‘black’ Mauritanians, especially haalpulaar’en, were 
stripped of their nationality and expelled to the other side of the Senegal river (Fresia 
2009; Ciavolella 2010). in June 2007, the former president, Sidi ould Cheikh abdellahi, 
encouraged refugees to return, as a step towards national reconciliation. nearly 15 000 
refugees returned. 
7 this survey project was carried out by diaL a French research unit from the institut 
de recherche pour le développement (ird). it was funded by agence nationale de la 
recherche (anr) and the agence Française de développement (aFd). the project called 
MiddaS, and managed by Flore gubert, tries to compare the everyday life, links with 
Senegal and remittances of Senegalese immigrants in France, italia, Spain, Mauritania and 
ivory Coast. We supervised the Mauritanian part of MiddaS program in november 2009, 
with Jean-noël Senne (inSee-ird).
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The Transit Period and Its Media Coverage
between august 2005 and May 2006, hundreds of black african migrants 
arrived in nouadhibou and tried, on board fishermen’s dinghies, to go up 
the coastline of Western Sahara and land on the Canary islands, on Span-
ish and hence european union territory. that was nothing but the lat-
est stage of a long process. in the early 2000s, african migrants had been 
attempting to reach europe via northern Morocco, crossing the fifteen 
kilometres of the Strait of gibraltar boarding tiny fishing vessels. in 2002, 
increased controls in the Mediterranean forced them to change route. 
they first tried the ports of Western Sahara, such as Laayoune, dakhla and 
especially tarfaya, situated just opposite the Canary archipelago (Map 1). 
When, with the events of october 2005 in Ceuta and Melilla,8 Moroccan 
border controls tightened, especially restricting travel to Morocco from 
Western Sahara and Mauritania, migrants attempting to reach the Canar-
ies had to move their points of departure even further south.
in this new situation, Mauritania, located 800 kilometres south of the 
Spanish islands, was for a time at the centre of West african migration 
routes (ba and Choplin 2005). in 2005, nouadhibou became the place 
from which crossing appeared most feasible. First of all, the closure of 
the border with Western Sahara—which was, moreover, mined—made 
it impossible for migrants to reach Morocco. tougher controls on fish-
ing boats from Mauritania bound for the Canaries or Spain made it more 
difficult to disembark african crews taken on at nouakchott or who had 
paid the captain for their sea passage. Finally, the completion of a paved 
road between nouakchott and nouadhibou in 2005 made travel to north-
ern Mauritania easier for those wanting to make the crossing (antil and 
Choplin 2003). thus, in late summer 2005, the first fishing boats left noua-
dhibou bound for the european islands, three days’ sailing distance from 
the coast. Listen to abdoulaye who succeeded in reaching the Canary 
islands in 2006 (Map 1): 
For five months, i had been waiting for an opportunity to cross from noua-
dhibou. the 15th of august, i left the town at midnight and walked as far 
as La gouera beach, 6 kilometres from nouadhibou, located in the West-
ern part of the Levrier Peninsula [See Map 2]. there, we boarded a small 
canoe, which took us offshore to a larger one. there were 129 of us. We had 
8 in october 2005, in Morocco, some black african migrants tried to cross barriers and 
fences of Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves. Seventeen of them were killed by Span-
ish policemen for having sought to enter the european union.
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35 petrol cans, a very good captain and a gPS program. Four days later, and 
800 kilometers farther north, we landed alive on the Canary island beach. 
it was very easy, we didn’t suffer a lot. (interview, nouadhibou, January 
2007).
abdoulaye had just been expulsed from the Canary islands when he told 
us his story. he explained he was waiting for a new opportunity to go to 
Spain:
now, it is more difficult. in 2006, people said the Canaries were facing 
nouadhibou, almost linked up by a bridge! the canoes were nicknamed “air 
Madrid” he added with a smile.
Closing the Sea: Externalisation of Mauritanian Migratory Policies
departures from nouadhibou to europe peaked in winter 2006—as did 
shipwrecks: although some africans succeeded in landing on the Canar-
ies, many others lost their lives at sea.9 Paul who failed to cross the sea 
explained the brutal reversal in nouadhibou: 
Since the winter of 2006, the small harbour has been nicknamed “Samba 
Lakra”, which means in Manding: go to one’s death. that is the place from 
where canoes took us towards death. everybody knew we might die while 
crossing the sea. but we had no choice. (interview, nouadhibou, January 
2007)
Forced by public pressure, the european union started to intervene from 
april 2006 onwards, by setting up a system of surveillance as part of Fron-
tex, the agency in charge of managing the european union’s external bor-
ders: one helicopter and several surveillance crafts were sent out, and 150 
men from the Spanish guardia Civil were dispatched to train Mauritanian 
police in border control. Four thousand people were arrested and repa-
triated to nouadhibou where, in summer 2006, a school was turned into 
a detention centre. Migrants who were arrested spent two to three days 
in this centre, nicknamed ‘guantanamito’ (‘Little guantanamo’), before 
being taken by coach to the Senegalese border, with fifty euros for each 
person. this vast system of control on the atlantic shores seems to have 
paid off, as, at the end of 2009, the Spanish government had registered 
only 2,300 arrivals on the Canary islands, as compared to 32,000 in 2006. 
9 about 20,000 people are said to have attempted to reach europe from nouadhibou 
in 2006. the Catholic mission in nouadhibou and the Mauritanian red Crescent, respec-
tively, estimate the deaths in route at 20% and 30% (and up to 40% in the blackest period, 
in February and March 2006). 
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© armelle Choplin, 2008
Map 1: Migration routes in Mauritania
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the Frontex agency was satisfied with these results and jumped to the 
conclusion that trans-Saharan migrations towards europe were finished. 
these figures mask hundreds of deaths and thousands of migrants who 
have been arrested, turned back or deported. in nouadhibou, although 
stricter controls have not stopped departures altogether, they certainly 
act as a filter. although some Mauritanians or foreigners boast that they 
know the route the helicopter will take even before it takes off, and stress 
that nobody will ever be able to ‘close the sea’, the number of departures 
has decreased. as an immediate result of these controls, a large number of 
migrants find themselves stuck and eventually settle in nouadhibou or in 
nouakchott, where they join the many other immigrants who have come 
to look for work in Mauritania.
Migrations and urban Changes
Spatial Boundaries, Social Divisions but Local Interactions 
among migrants hoping to reach europe, only a very few manage to get 
through as soon as they arrive in nouadhibou. Many more stay for some 
time, because they need to look for an opportunity to leave, have to earn 
enough money to pay for their journey, or because of repeated failures. 
they invest the city, particularly the downtown area. From the 1990s, Moors 
started to move away from the centre of the city, Qairaan, which they 
considered rundown and noisy because full of immigrants (Map 2). they 
decided to live in the north of the city, in a new, airy, less densely settled 
residential area called Numerouaat (‘the numbers’). the richest among 
them have built villas in ‘dubai’ or ‘baghdad’, the most recently-built resi-
dential quarters. the geographical shift of local inhabitants explains why 
the city has sprawled towards the north. transit migrants settle in the 
centre of the city, left vacant by Moors, and in its various sub-sections 
with rather eloquent names (‘accra’ and ‘ghana-town’), and in the areas 
near the old fishing port (‘Lareiguib’, ‘SNIM city’) (Choplin and Lombard 
2008). unlike the young vulnerable men waiting for a passage that has by 
now become illusory, the majority of ‘old migrants’ in nouadhibou reside 
in the Numerouaat, especially in the earlier developments (Socogim, ‘Pre-
mier Robinet ’ and ‘Deuxième robinet’ [First and second water-tap]). Most 
of them are not here to travel north, but rather to earn money to invest 
back home. thus, the city is divided into three distinctive zones: the South 
of the city (Qairaan), where young adventurers are looking for a way to get 
to europe and for temporary employment to fund their travels; the north 
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Map 2: nouadhibou
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(Numerouaat) inhabited by Mauritanians; and an intermediate zone (the 
older sections of the Numerouaat), home to migrants who have lived here 
for a while and who can draw on denser local social networks. the vacant 
space epitomizes the buffer landscape between the three areas. the main 
road, called “boulevard median” links them.
because nouakchott is much larger, migrants are more spread out there. 
Yet, some “old” popular quarters are known to be “immigrants’ quarters” 
such as ‘Médina’, ‘Ksar’, ‘Cinquième’, and ‘Sixième’ (Map 3). our Middas 
survey shows that 25% of Senegalese immigrants have found a place to 
live thanks to a family, 24% thanks to a person from the same village, and 
25% through fellow countrymen. Moreover, rents in these quarters are less 
expensive. these areas are mainly occupied by black Mauritanian people 
(halpulaar, Soninke . . .). that is why they are often considered as “black 
areas” (in opposition to “white areas” where Moors live). Furthermore, 
some Moors call them “quarters of foreigners.” this vision is dangerous 
because it implies that black Mauritanian are foreigners; of course that is 
not the case. although foreigners are numerous in ‘Cinquième’ or ‘Sixième’, 
they remain a minority. Migrants do not choose these areas because they 
are “black areas” but because the presence of long established migrants 
and strong networks help them to find accommodation easily. in both 
cities, spatial boundaries reproduce social divisions, linked to the date of 
arrival and the reasons for migration: if everybody owns his or her place 
in society, he also has his ‘place’ in the city. 
Yet, interactions are strong: the newly arrived migrants rely on long-
time settled migrants who act as intermediaries with local society. net-
works of solidarity—whose scope should not be overestimated—have 
developed among nationals of the same country (Streiff-Fénart, Poutignat 
2006). every national community has its own association, more or less 
well organised and active, led by a representative, who is in charge of 
receiving and helping newcomers.10 in addition to these ‘official’ repre-
sentatives, others act as jatigi, ‘referees’ or guarantors, because they are 
known locally and play an important part in the local economy.11 For 
10 in 2001, several associations of foreign nationals came together in the Union des asso-
ciations d’étrangers à Nouadhibou (uaen), allowing them to acquire a certain public vis-
ibility and local recognition. after some internal problems, the association disappeared. 
but, since december 2010, the FaMeM (Fédération des associations des migrants d’afrique 
de l’ouest) has been recognized officially by Mauritanian authorities.
11  Fore a more detailed discussion of the role of the jatigi (‘correspondent’ in pulaar, 
meaning both landlord and trader), see bredeloup (2007). 
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example, in nouakchott in the district of ‘Cinquième’, since 1993 the rep-
resentative of Senegalese taxi drivers has been the correspondent of the 
powerful national transport union. due to this position, he helps most of 
his countrymen to work as taxi drivers in this area: 
i receive many men from Senegal who only know my name and the quar-
ter i live in. usually, i accommodate my compatriots for one week. then, 
i introduce them to other drivers. i am a mediator. (interview, nouakchott, 
January 2007)
that is also the case of idrissa, a Senegalese painter in his thirties, living 
in nouadhibou:
i have been living in nouadhibou since 2000. over the years, Mauritanian 
and Spanish employers have come to trust me. i am a painter on small 
building sites. i live in a compound at ‘numeros’. the landlord is a Maurita-
nian halpulaar. i supervise his compound. i help people from my region to 
find a room. i offer them a room in my compound. the landlord offers me 
a discount on my rent if i find him tenants. i can also propose my compa-
triots jobs in the building site i am working for. Yes, i am such a jatigi. but 
i have never been involved in the crossing business. (interview, nouadhi-
bou, november 2008)
it is the same logic for Mamoudou, a Senegalese tailor who owns several 
ready-made clothes shops in nouadhibou and dakar:
i work with a Moor belonging to an influential tribe. he lets me shops and 
equipment. in exchange, we share the profits. Sometimes, i welcome and 
employ some young Senegalese when they arrive. (interview, nouadhibou, 
September 2007)
these examples shed light on the frequent interactions between these 
foreign businessmen and migrants. they offer a useful framework for 
understanding hierarchies based on work and employment. in the key 
sectors that attract large numbers of foreigners (fishing, transport, con-
struction work, etc.), labour is mostly organised along similar lines: a 
Mauritanian contractor—frequently a Moor—dominates the sector and 
is backed up by local or foreign intermediaries (mostly black Mauritani-
ans or Senegalese from the Senegal valley) who offer insecure and badly-
paid jobs to recently arrived migrants. the migrants are thereby made 
to fit into a society that is already strongly hierarchical and dominated 
by (white) Moors (bîdân), where they find themselves at the bottom of 
the pile, competing for jobs with haratîn (black Moors, descendents of 
former slaves). it is very difficult to move up to a higher level, especially 
for those who are newly arrived. transport is one of the rare sectors in 
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which foreigners can own their vehicle. but this position is not frequent: 
most of the taxi drivers start working for a Mauritanian boss, like abdou 
in nouadhibou. they have fragile agreements and usually work on the 
unprofitable routes left vacant by the Mauritanians. as they usually do not 
have all their papers and licence in order, they have to pay fines or bribes 
when they are controlled. 
i am still on the same taxi route, between downtown and the harbour. i was 
born in Saint-Louis and arrived for the first time in nouadhibou in 1986. up 
to now, i have been a taxi driver. in 1989, because of “the events”, i went 
back to Senegal and was a taxi driver in dakar. in 2001, i came back to Mau-
ritania. i worked for a Mauritanian. in 2004, i helped my brother who owns 
a taxi car. (interview, nouakchott, January 2007).
Parallels can be drawn with fishing (Streiff-Fénart, Poutignat, 2006). in 
this sector, some foreigners have become essential figures in the local 
economy because of their detailed knowledge of local constraints and 
their longstanding presence in the economic and social environment of 
nouadhibou: 
John is nigerian. he has been living in Mauritania for ten years. everyday 
he goes to bountia, a shore where trawlers have been stranded. there, fish 
is dried. Work is distributed between immigrants: Senegalese fish, Malians 
and guineans salt and dry, nigerians and ghanaians buy and export. “That’s 
labour division” explains John with humour. he exports several containers 
of fish to nigeria. he often goes to Lagos to take delivery of the containers. 
Mauritanians tolerate his business because he pays considerable taxes to 
export the goods (interview, nouadhibou, September 2007).
Following the model of small trans-national enterprises  (glick-Schiller, 
basch L. & Szanton blanc 1995; Portes, guarnizo & Landolt 1999; Waldinger 
2010), some foreigners take advantage of national borders, of their abil-
ity to cross them and therefore to benefit from price differentials. Such 
examples of success, based on the ability to claim to belong to two or 
more places at once, paint an unfamiliar image: one of migrants as active 
entrepreneurs, rather than as dependent and insecure wage-labourers 
exploited by rapacious locals. but, if these entrepreneurs want to stay 
and do their business, they have to share the profit or pay tax to the local 
society. one former Malian big business man explained to us: 
i was one of the most important fish businessmen. i went to hong Kong to 
do market prospection. i earned a lot of money. i built a beautiful and big 
house. Mauritanian people were jealous of my success. as i was not asso-
ciated to a local guy, they destroyed me. now i sell fish in the port every 
evening. Like everybody. (interview, nouadhibou, September 2007).
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Connecting Places and People
the different routes and rhythms of migration have transformed the 
appearance of the two main Mauritanian cities and have boosted the local 
economy. Sub-Saharan migrants, who bring with them their own ways 
and ideas about urban life, increasingly put their stamp on certain parts 
of nouadhibou and nouakchott. the latter now look rather different from 
the rest of town, shaped, as they are, by the same type of housing, the same 
shops and socio-spatial practices as sub-Saharan neighbouring capitals. in 
Qairaan, foreigners manage no fewer than forty shops. the restaurants’ 
names (‘Le fleuve’, the ‘Djolof ’) recall the Senegal Valley influence. Fashion 
shops with the photo of Youssou n’dour are frequent. engine or wood-
work shops (Touba Boutique, Touba Menuiserie) often refer to the owner’s 
affiliation to the Mouride brotherhood. in nouakchott, some toponyms 
(‘Mali Garage’, ‘Senegal Garage’) evoke the presence of foreigners (Map 3). 
Migrants and immigrants have produced their own urban spaces and 
points of reference. but, these toponyms are more than a mere reference 
to the region of origin. it is a way to stress long-established connections 
between these areas and external places. through its migrant population, 
the centre of nouadhibou is directly linked to ‘Cinquième’ and ‘Médina’ 
districts in nouakchott, but also to dakar, Saint-Louis, bamako and other 
towns in guinea. in ‘Qairaan’, in ‘Cinquième’ and ‘Sixième’, colourful shops 
attract many foreigners. Streets are also places of diversity. ivorian shop-
keepers sell “trendy” clothes and shoes to Mauritanian women. the ‘stan-
dards’, that is to say the Cd and dVd shops, blast out high level sound 
on the street. Further on, a snooker room serves as a meeting point for 
young people. it looks like a scene from the suburbs of Lagos rather than 
Mauritania. in these streets, solidarity and exchange, negotiation and con-
flicts, meeting and shunning take place. Social links are created in this 
“quotidian co-presence”, as underlined by W. berthomière and M.a. hily 
(2006) in beirut and tel-aviv cases. the quoted Middas survey highlights 
the links between migrants and their native country: 47% of those inter-
viewed declare they go back to Senegal every year, 18% at least twice a 
year. only 15% say they never return. in comparison, the guinean store-
keepers settled in nouadhibou specify that they return home every 12 or 
18 months.
today, the presence of these migrants is changing the image of nouak-
chott. Previously, the various ‘arab’ governments have tried to create the 
‘capital of nomads’ (implying ‘Moorish nomads’) (Choplin 2009). the 
current circulatory migrations enhance the city’s historic cultural links 
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with the Senegal Valley. it recalls the Senegalese atmosphere that reigned 
here when nouakchott was first founded, an atmosphere that the arab 
governments have, over the past three decades, rather clumsily tried to 
hide. the “concessions” in ‘Cinquième’ or ‘Sixième’ give relevant evidence 
of these links. in these quarters, most of the landlords are Mauritanian 
Soninké who have emigrated to europe or the united States (timera 1996; 
 Manchuelle 1997). they have invested their remittances in real estate and 
now have a virtual monopoly in these areas. these new urban local figures 
constitute essential go-betweens. they keep strong links with foreigners 
and transit migrants. because of the political unrest and sporadic tensions 
(like in 1989 or 2000 between Mauritania and Senegal), immigrants do 
not risk investing in real estate. only 4% of Senegalese say they are own-
ers (Middas Survey, 2010). Faced with the demand for rental accommoda-
tion, most of the Soninké landowners rent rooms in their concessions. 
thanks to this community, different kinds of migration are embedded 
in one another. during our fieldwork, we observed several times in the 
same concession transit migrants and long-term settled migrants. For a 
long time, the owners of the concessions have not been living there but 
in France. Clearly, long established and international Soninké networks 
are connected to nearby work migration and more recently to migration 
towards europe. new migratory flows are not independent from pre-exist-
ing social networks but are based on them. 
nouakchott and similarly nouadhibou stand out as ‘cosmopolitan’ 
Saharan cities (brachet 2009; boesen, Marfaing 2007), clearly different 
from the rather austere towns of the Mauritanian desert. both share com-
mon points with rosso, the third city of the country, settled on the border 
between Mauritania and Senegal. in this town, people speak both wolof 
and hassâniyya.12 everyday, traders come from the other side of the river 
and buy goods imported from China via dubai. in these localities, we 
are witnessing not merely exchanges between Saharans and sub-Saharan 
migrants, but rather the development of an original and locally specific 
kind of urbanity. important changes can be underlined in the context of 
religion. in the islamic republic of Mauritania, Muslim migrants can eas-
ily practice their religion. Senegalese migrants rely on strong Sufi broth-
erhood networks (tijâniyya and Qadariyya) on both sides of the Senegal 
Valley (ould Cheikh 2004). the religious network maintains a place to 
live and provides refuge for newly arrived migrants (bava 2005), as is the 
12 Local arab dialect.
69-94_TRIULZI-MCKENZIE_F6.indd   83 1/16/2013   10:43:14 AM
84 armelle choplin and jérôme lombard
case in the Mouride dahira in nouadhibou. Most amazing is the spread 
of Christian influence. if the local authorities have tolerated the Catho-
lic mission since French colonisation, it is another matter for the new 
evangelical churches. the arrival of english-speaking migrants wanting to 
work in fishing explains the development of such cults. in 2007, in noua-
dhibou, we discovered two branches of nigerian churches, managed by 
young pastors, sent by their hierarchies and burning supporters of pros-
elytising as observed in all of West africa (Fourchard, Mary, otayek 2005). 
Collins, one of the young nigerian disciples of the Christ Crusader Min-
istry, explains:
i went to nouadhibou because god told me to. before arriving here, i trav-
elled a lot. i crossed benin, burkina, Mali. then, i flew to nouakchott. From 
there, i went to nouadhibou. here, i couldn’t find my former religion. So, 
i embraced another one. i am a hairdresser and i work beside the church. 
Sometimes, i help my church by distributing Christian brochures. i know it 
is dangerous. relationships with Mauritanian people are tough. (interview, 
nouadhibou, november 2008)
Collins left nouadhibou in 2009, after the Christ Crusader Ministry pastor 
stole the cash box and fled to Spain . . . obviously, nouadhibou is not the 
place to be any more.
An Economic Boost . . . Now Finished
the impact of transit migration has provided local society with important 
economic benefits. it can be seen in the real estate sector. in downtown 
nouadhibou, the few compounds still owned by old Moorish families have 
been redesigned in order to increase rent. the tent (khayma) that used 
to be pitched in the middle of the courtyard has been replaced by newly 
built rooms, each housing four to five people, thereby reflecting the grow-
ing demand for rental accommodation caused by transit migration. in 
2000, a rich Moorish businessman and descendent of an influential local 
tribe decided to build a ‘Senegalese housing estate’ (Cité des Sénégalais). 
after illegally appropriating a street between Qairaan and Lareiguib, he 
built on either side a line of rooms of ten square metres each, rented out 
on a daily or monthly basis (for about 5,000 uM or 16 €). as rents are high, 
migrants group together to share rooms. Malians and people from Casa-
mance in Senegal have organised their own collective residences, called 
“foyers” bearing witness to the efficiency of community networks estab-
lished by migrants abroad. 
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Since 2007 however, the almost complete halt to crossings to the Canary 
islands caused by stricter controls have slowed down economic activities. 
Many shops in the centre have closed down, Senegalese restaurants have 
reduced the daily quantity of rice prepared; rooms hired out by locals stay 
empty, young men have returned to their home countries. although, by 
the end of 2007, many Malians and Senegalese would still arrive hoping 
to ‘make it’, successful crossings had become rare, as the representative 
of the Senegalese in nouadhibou, interviewed in September 2007, put it: 
‘those who were meant to make it have done so. For those who stayed 
behind, it is too late now.’ 
Migration to and through nouadhibou seems to be running out of 
steam. indeed, transit migration, which has led to a revival of the city’s 
economy over recent years, appears to be in jeopardy. nouadhibou no lon-
ger experiences urban and economic growth as was the case in the 1980s. 
it is no longer the place where fortunes are made quickly, nor a bustling 
harbour on the way to europe. the city is declining, as indicated by the 
decrease both in employment offered and in fishing (Choplin, Lombard 
2008). the situation is no longer one of transit, but rather one of post-
transit and, consequently, the issue of migration is dealt with in new ways. 
Yet, despite our studies highlight the fact that crossings have considerably 
slowed down in nouadhibou, and almost stopped, the “transit situation” is 
still a subject of debate in nouakchott. thus, a temporal discrepancy, and 
also a spatial discrepancy can be brought to light: the spaces where the 
migrants are supposed to be (nouadhibou), and where they are accused 
of creating problems in the eyes of local and european authorities, are not 
the spaces where the migration issue is managed and where the money is 
arriving to do it (nouakchott). this double spatio-temporal discrepancy is 
surprising: why is it said in nouakchott that “illegal migrants” are crossing 
the sea in great numbers in spite of all the outstanding elements which 
prove that nouadhibou’s “transit function” is now called into question?
a new geography of Migratory governance in  
Post-transit Context
Struggle Against Clandestinity . . . and Terrorism
With the new “post-transit” context, the issue of migration is no longer at 
the top of the political agenda. as an employee of the unhCr explained 
to us in January 2009, “we have more important problems to deal with. 
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We are no longer in 2006.” nonetheless, he continues, “by now, we have 
400,000 migrants!” Such numbers are oddly incoherent: in late 2006, a 
report commissioned by the same unhCr estimated that there were 
between 160,000 and 200,000 sub-Saharans in Mauritania.13 even though 
the number of migrants probably increased immediately after controls 
tightened, two years later, our fieldwork research indicated a clear reduc-
tion in overall numbers. Yet, at the end of 2009, in the terms of reference 
for a “technical assistance post in Mauritania for the development of a 
national strategy in migratory flows management and an aid program in 
the 10th Fed framework” proposed by the european Commission, it was 
stipulated: “according to the authorities, migrants in Mauritania could be 
around 500,000 persons (unverifiable figure), i.e. 15% of overall popula-
tion”. these figures are manipulated all the more easily because of the 
absence of reliable statistical evidence. Moreover, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish between permanently settled migrants and those who are in 
transit (that is why the figures are unverifiable). Furthermore, numbers 
vary throughout the year, depending on agricultural and fishing seasons 
for instance, while also being affected by long-term changes sparked off 
by the volatile political climate in West africa. 
the toughened controls against illegal immigration engender immedi-
ate changes for sub-Saharans settled in Mauritania. Whereas before, secu-
rity forces arrested illegal migrants ‘caught in the act’, as they were getting 
onto the boat, they now arrest them beforehand, at home, in the streets 
or even while they are making their way into the city. the arrival in the 
city of nouadhibou is striking. in the north of the city, there is a com-
pulsory entry point called “Le bouchon.” this point is in the narrow strip 
between the sea, the railway and the international border with Western 
Sahara/Morocco (photo 1). it is precisely at that point that police forces 
have set up their check-point. as a consequence, they consistently check 
all vehicles. Migrants are well aware of the “bouchon,” where they are 
afraid of being turned back, without any valid reason. amnesty interna-
tional (2008) has denounced these arbitrary arrests. Migrants are accused 
of intending to reach Spain illegally, even if police do not have any proof. 
thus, in this post-transit migration situation, all “black foreigners” can 
be considered as “clandestine migrants”, be taken in for questioning and 
expulsed. 
13 See ioM, unhCr & european union, 2006; FnuaP, 2007 & 2008. these reports 
emphasise the difficulty of distinguishing transit migrants from those long settled. 
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© a. Choplin, 2011; google earth data
Photo 1: Zoom in “Le bouchon”, the compulsory checkpoint in the north of 
nouadhibou
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Such arrests are in fact themselves illegal: although Mauritania has, since 
2000, withdrawn from eCoWaS (economic Community of West african 
States), the concomitant agreements on free movement between its mem-
bers remain in force. nationals of the fifteen member states, especially 
Senegalese and Malians, continue, to varying degrees regulated by bilateral 
agreements, to have privileged rights of access and residence. according 
to this legislation, actual ‘illegal’ entries and departures from Mauritanian 
territory are rare: to travel around Mauritania is usually neither a crime 
nor an offence. Yet, controls are carried out “upstream” from nouadhibou, 
on the major roads, sometimes faraway from the borders. For example, in 
the Maghta Lahjar police checkpoint (500 km from the Malian border), 
officers have decided to control the vaccination certificates of foreign bus 
passengers. Seydou, a Malian citizen, explains: 
there were six of us. they forced us to get off the bus. We could not show 
our certificates. they stopped us there. they forced us to take the bus in 
the opposite direction, going back towards the Malian border. We waited 
in aioun police station [130 km from the Malian border] for another bus. 
When we went to the toilets, officers went with us! they sent us to Mali. on 
the border, we did as everybody does: we bought a vaccination certificate for 
2 000 CFa (3€). We were like expulsed migrants! (interview, Malian border, 
november 2009)
northern and southern borders seem to be under european union control 
whereas arbitrary and one-off checks can take place everywhere within 
the vast Mauritanian territory. urban spaces where migrants are living, 
border towns they visit regularly to do business, roads they take to move 
around are changed into controlled, frightening spaces. the control stakes 
have been higher since there has been a “terrorism threat.” this issue was 
debated in the presidential campaign in June 2009. the unlawful ruling 
government boasted about “struggling at the same time against terrorism 
and clandestine migration”.14 because of this dangerous confusion, the 
Mauritanian government has negotiated financial agreements and ‘part-
nership’ with europe in exchange for the european presence inside its 
national territory. Since 2003, the united States of america has been inter-
ested in the struggle against al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (aQMi), for-
mer groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, and in controlling 
this “grey zone” and people movements (Keenan 2005; Lecocq & Schrijver 
14 “immigration clandestine et terrorisme: les européens louent le rôle du haut Conseil 
d’État”, Le Véridique, 14/06/2009. 
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2007). thus, in this “global geography of risks and threats” (Kraxberger 
2005), the Mauritanian government takes financial advantages from the 
struggle against poverty, terrorism and ‘clandestine migration’. 
“We are in the path of clandestine immigration, drugs and weapons 
trafficking,” declared the Mauritanian defence Minister hamadi ould 
baba ould hamadi in June 2010.15 in order to enhance national territory 
security, a dozen additional checkpoints have been created since the sum-
mer of 2010 along the Senegalese and Malian borders in order to settle 
and control people. twenty-one new mobile police squads and special 
anti-terrorism intervention groups have been set up. this tight surveil-
lance, which can be observed all over the Sahara, is linked to an increas-
ing “technologization”: all these checkpoints have been kitted out with 
computer hardware. the aim is to create a foreigner’s entry file. Moreover, 
the government requires a biometric system and has sold its national reg-
istry office to the French group Safran (for € 17 millions).16 even if we are 
sceptical of this biometric interest, we notice that this new security order, 
based on a technicization of controls (radars, biometry, computerization) 
(bigo 2007; Collyer 2007), has an impact on people’s regional mobility. 
in the context of a terrorist threat, migrants are perceived as a source of 
insecurity, both potential “illegal migrants” as well as terrorists.
Geopolitical Stakes: Towards a Bipolar Space
in this new context, Mauritania’s geopolitical situation is redefined. inter-
national Mauritanian borders, cities, roads, airports, etc., are now places 
of controls, often imposed by external actors like fund providers. in those 
places, sometimes far from the city centre, the european union is vis-
ible. it is now obvious that the european union border has been externa-
lised as a consequence of its tougher migration restrictions. its rules seem 
to overwhelm those of eCoWaS. as a consequence of the readmission 
agreement, migrants arrested at sea or in nouadhibou are jailed in the 
‘guantanamito’ detention camp (Map 2). but the government appears to 
be ‘embarrassed’ by this centre (the visible counterpart of the readmission 
agreement): transfers and expulsions are generally carried out at night, 
and out of sight of the Mauritanian public. in these peripheral areas, the 
15 isabelle Mandraud, “Pour contrer al-Qaida, la Mauritanie érige des  postes-frontières”, 
Le Monde, 4 juin 2010.
16 this biometric shift is also promoted by eCoWaS. an eCoWaS visa (called  eCoViSa) 
is planned for 2012.
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european union keeps a low profile while remaining visible. at the Mali-
Mauritanian border, between nioro and aïoun, a notice shows the inter-
vention of the Migration information and Management Centre (CigeM) 
located in bamako, via its PaMireg program (Welcoming projects for 
unwilling return migrants and transit migrants in gogui). Fifty meters 
behind the police checkpoint, two brand-new little white rooms  “welcome” 
the illegal migrants pushed back from Mauritania (aeM, aPdha 2008). 
on the Senegalese border, the Spanish red Cross flag floats in the air. 
it has set up another “welcome centre.” Migrants are looked after for 
48 hours—fed and accommodated—and then invited to go away. this 
european union presence on the border hampers even more the popula-
tion flow between West-african eCoWaS member countries. 
thus, new migratory governance has brought to the fore a bipolar 
space. “bad spaces,” stigmatized as “clandestine places,” are emerging in 
opposition to “good spaces” where the migration issue is managed. Periph-
eral areas are punctuated with these bad spaces: transit towns like noua-
dhibou or nioro-du-Sahel in Mali; detention camps; migrant quarters in 
the crossroad-towns (Qairaan in nouadhibou, Cinquième and  Sixième in 
nouakchott); turning back areas like on the Malian-Mauritanian border 
where CigeM “welcome” migrants; red Cross aid stations; customs; mili-
tary and police checkpoints. the nicknames themselves express this stig-
matisation and spatial distancing: Kandahar (the no man’s land between 
Morocco and Mauritania), Le Bouchon (police checkpoint entry to noua-
dhibou), Guantanamito (detention camp), Nouadhibou-du-monde, a city 
where migrants are stranded. 
a distinction is made between spaces where migrants might go through 
or settle down and spaces where the migratory issue is managed. it is 
relevant that the “problem” is taken care of by exogenous actors, and not 
in the national territory peripheral areas but from urban centres. nouak-
chott, dakar, bamako, rabat are the central places where uhCr, ioM, 
delegations of the european union have set up their headquarters, where 
experts’ offices have been opened up, where the headquarters of ngos 
involved in “upgrading the living conditions of migrants” have been set 
up. there, workshop meetings and international panels on this issue take 
place, drawing up national migratory policies. there is one workshop 
meeting after another in nouakchott but not in nouahdibou or in rosso. 
Funds from financial backers and foreign aid arrive and are concentrated 
and invested in the capital city. nouadhibou, on the other hand, has suf-
fered a downgrading. up to the 1980s, it was the economic centre of the 
country. but it has experienced an economic decline and received bad 
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press. Most studies have denounced the use of the “transit city” concept 
(Choplin, Lombard 2008; Streiff-Fénart, Poutignat 2008), largely because it 
has been used and twisted into “illegal migrants city” by the international 
media. as a result, institutions, politicians, and Mauritanian citizens are 
using this expression to belittle the northern city. nouadhibou is being 
marginalized whereas nouakchott is asserting itself as the political and 
economic capital city. 
a parallel can be drawn between this spatial dichotomy and the “good” 
and “bad migrants” categories formulated in the north and adopted by the 
South. representatives of financial bankers, long-time settled migrants 
appropriate the rhetoric of illegal migration developed in europe. the 
representatives of foreign national communities lobby for the recogni-
tion of their rights as ‘honest foreign workers’ and insist on their regular 
movements spurred on by business. they contribute to freeze categories: 
they introduce themselves as “transnational entrepreneurs” in opposition 
to the ‘adventurers’, the transit migrants ‘who undercut salaries’ and are 
seen to be linked to illicit activities (drugs, alcohol, prostitution, etc.) they 
strongly condemn those who just travel through. 
therefore, the “post-transit” context involves a spatial reversal and a 
new migratory governance geography: a noble centre where the migra-
tion issue is managed (the capital city) and on the contrary, peripheries 
where the supposed stowaways and smugglers live, with the migration 
repression instruments (retention centre, check-points, helicopters, etc.) 
and the trafficking they are usually accused of. this new ‘post-transit’ 
situation generates a hostile reception from sub-Saharans. but it reflects 
more general tensions inherent in internal political dynamics in Mauri-
tania. because for some nationalists black Mauritanians and sub-Saharan 
immigrants are lumped together under the category of ‘black foreigners’, 
in the migration issue a great deal is at stake. 
Conclusion 
in summary, transit migration—and more broadly various transnational 
connections established by repeated return travel and by the interplay of 
different migratory networks—situate Mauritania at the heart of a much 
larger region. We have attempted to show that there is a discrepancy 
between the reality of the migratory issue (nowadays stopped because of 
the european union rules transposed into Mauritania) and its manage-
ment. indeed, trans-Saharan migrations are not managed in peripheral 
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areas or in the Saharan space but outside of these zones. this new geog-
raphy of migratory governance marginalizes migrants and migration 
spaces such as retention centres and border checkpoints. this new situa-
tion results from the asymmetrical relations between european countries, 
which have externalized their migratory system, and the supposed emi-
gration and transit countries. 
as a result, some migrants are now stranded in Mauritania. this post-
transit situation involves the renewal of some xenophobic attitudes. it 
makes necessary a more subtle reading of the cosmopolitan aspect of 
main Mauritanian cities. in nouadhibou and nouakchott, foreigners and 
local society are living side-by-side rather than together. this rampant 
racism and autochthony echoes back to other african and european situ-
ations (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005; geschiere 2009). the current “arab 
revolution” has aroused european people’s suspicion towards migrants 
coming from africa. Some politicians do not hesitate to use rhetorical 
images, most of them irrelevant, such as “biblical exodus” as umberto 
bossi (italian north Ligue) said, or they suggest “putting migrants back on 
the boats” as Chantal brunel said (Former French right wing Member of 
Parliament). these populist comments hide the fact that migrations are 
quite well controlled and migrants are stranded on Southern Mediterra-
nean shores. Moreover, they do not explain that not all african migrants 
want to go to europe. Let us just remember that main migration flows are 
intra-african.
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